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NoTEs
it along with a statement by the person making the statements acknowledging
said recording would work satisfactorily. At any rate, the court has before it the
persons authenticating the recording and it would seem that their testimony is as
reliable as that relating to any other matter sought o be inroduced. To preclude
recordings because of the possibility of alterations would seem as logical as saying
that nobody should be permitted to testify for fear that they may tell an untruth.
WILLIAM T.

WHO

Is A

HARVEY

GUEST WITHIN MEANING OF AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTES

A large percent of the litigation resulting from motor vehicle accidents involves a class of legislation commonly called "guest statutes". Generally, such a
statute provides that *an owner or operator of an automobile is absolved from
liability to a guest unless he is guilty of some degree of conduct greater than
ordinary negligence. 1 Of the 262 states that have enacted such statutes, 173 of
them have attempted to define a "guest". Most of these statutary definitions are
similar in nature but contain slight variations of terms. Thus, one who rides
gratuitously in some states is a guest, 4 while others who are carried without compensation,S or free of charge, 6 or without payment therefor,7 are guests under the
statutes of other jurisdictions. The remaining states simply use the word guest.8
I. See 2 Wyo. L. J. 182 (1947) for discussion on degrees of care required under the
various statutes. For general discussion on liability to a guest see 94 A. L. R. 1221;
20 Va. L. Rev. 326 (1934).
2. Ala. Code 1940 tit. 36 sec. 95; Pope's Digest of Ark. Stat. 1937 sec. 1302-04; Vehicle
Code of Cal. 1935 sec. 403; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935 c. 16, sec. 371; Del. Rev. Code 1935
sec. 5713; Fla. Stat. 1941 see. 320.59; Idaho Code Ann. 1932 sec. 48-901; I1. Rev. Stat.
1947 c. 951/ Par. 58a; Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann. 1938 see. 47-1021; Gen. Stat. of Kan.
1935 sec. 8-122b; Mich. Comp. Laws 1929 sec. 4648; Mont. Rev. Code 1935 sec. 1748.1;
Rev. Stat. Neb. 1935 sec. 39174; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929 Supp. 1941 sec. 4439; N. M.
Stat. Ann. 1941 sec. 68-1001; N. D. Rev. Code 1943 sec. 39-1501; Throckmorton's Ohio
Code Ann. 1936 sec. 6308-6; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940 sec. 115-1001; S. C. Code
1932 sec. 5908; S. D. Code 1939 see. 44.0362; Vernon's Tex. Stat. 1948 sec. 6701b; Utah
Code Ann. 1943 Tit. 57, c. 11, sec. 7; Vt. Public Laws 1933 sec. 5113; Michie's Code
Va. 1942 sec. 2154-232; Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 60-1201; Rem. Rev. Stat. of
Wash. sec. 6360-121.
3. N. D. Rev. Code 1943 sec. 39-1501; S. D. Code 1939 sec. 44.0362; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947
c. 95% par. 58a; Gen. Stat. of Kan. 1935 sec. 8-122b; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929 Supp.
1941, sec. 4439; Vt. Public Laws 1933 sec. 5113; S. C. Code 1932 sec. 5908; Idaho Code
Ann. 1932 sec. 48-901; Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann. 1938 sec. 47-1021; Ala. Code 1940 Tit.
36 sec. 95; Vernon's Tex. Stat. 1948 sec. 6701b; Throckmorton's Code of Ohio Ann.
1936 sec. 6308-6; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940 sec. 115-1001; Utah Code Ann. 1943
Tit. 57, c. 11, sec. 7; N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941 sec. 68-1001; Del. Rev. Code 1935 sec. 5713;
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 60-1201.
4. Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann. 1938 sec. 47-1021; Ala. Code 1940 Tit. 36 sec. 95; Vernon's
Tex. Stat. 1948 see. 6708-6; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940 sec. 115-1001.
5. Utah Code Ann. 1943 Tit. 57, c. 11, sec. 7.
6. N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941 sec. 68-1001.
7. N. D. Rev. Code 1943 sec. 39-1501; S. D. Code 1939 sec. 44.0362; Vt. Public Laws
1933 sec. 5113; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947 c. 951/2 par. 58a; Del. Rev. Code 1935 sec. 5713;
Gen. Stat. of Kan. 1935 sec. 8-122b; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929 Supp. 1941, sec. 4439;
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 60-1201 ; S. C. Code 1932 see. 5908; Idaho Code Ann. 1932
sec. 48-901.
8. Fla. Stat. 1931 Supp. 1947, sec. 320.59; Pope's Digest of Ark. Stat. 1937 sec. 1302-04;
Vehicle Code of Cal. 1935 sec. 403; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935 vol. 2, c. 16, sec. 371.
Michie's Code Va. 1942 sec. 2154-232; Mich. Comp. Laws 1929 sec. 4648; Mont. Rev.
Code 1935 sec. 1748.1; Rev. Stat. Neb. 1935 sec. 39174.
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It is evident, whether there has been an attempted definition, or the mere use of
the word guest, that the language used was intended to allow flexibility of application to the great variety of factual situations that have and can arise. However,
it is because of this ambiguous language, that difficulties of interpretation have
arisen. As a result, volumes of judicial decisions could be assembled concerning
definitions of guests. Such legislative and judicial definitions are inadequate
standing alone, and it is the purpose of this article to put into several categories the
types of factual situations that have been considered by the courts in arriving at
their ultimate decisions.
In every jurisdiction where the statutes have been construed, the courts have
agreed that before the occupant is taken out of the guest class, some benefit to the
owner or operator must accrue. The benefit may be pecuniary but does not necessarily have to be so. 9 The benefit must be tangible and the motivating influence
in offering the ride.10 It need not be a present benefit, but an expectation of one
is sufficient,1) and it may be paid by someone other than the occupant in his behalf.12 In determining whether the owner or operator has received such a benefit,
the facts and circumstances of each case are taken into consideration.13 However
great the variety of the factual situations may seem, taken as a whole, these situations can be divided without difficulty into three somewhat overlapping but distinct
categories.
The first of these is when the ride is purely social. When the ride was offered
and accepted with nothing in mind other than for social purposes, it has been uniformly held that the occupant is a guest. Thus, when a driver escorted his girl
friend to a dancel4 or when a mother, acting as a chaperon, accompanied her
daughter to a school prom,15 the statute has been applied and the occupant considered a guest. A visit to a mutual friend to dine out, 16 or an invitation to a football game,17 or evening of Rook,18 are other such social purposes. A case of this
type is seldom presented because the plaintiff or occupant almost invariably attempts to show that the driver was benefitted in such a manner that the statute
does not apply.
A second type of case with which the courts have been confronted, involves
the situation when the ride is offered for the sole gain of the occupant. A hitchhiker thumbing a ride,19 an occupant requesting to be taken to a particular
place,20 or a person accepting an offer of a ride part way to his destination 2 1 have
9. Melcher v. Adams, 174 Ore. 75, 146 P. (2d) 354 (1944).

10. McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. (2d) 279, 70 P. (2d) 909 (1937).
11. Van Auker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 8 N. W. (2d)
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(1943).
12. Elliott v. Behner, 146 Kan. 827, 73 P. (2d) 1116 (1937).

13. Humphrey's v. San Francisco Area Boy Scouts of America, 22 Cal. (2d) 36, 139 P.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

(2d) 941 (1943).
Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P. (2d) 615 (1936).
Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86, 77 P. (2d) 382 (1938).
Boyd v. Mueller, 320 Ill. App. 303, 50 N. E. (2d) 847 (1943).
Dibble v. Harper's Estate, 294 Mich. 453, 293 N. W. 715 (1940).
Swinney v. Roler, 113 Ind. App. 367, 47 N. E. (2d) 846 (1943).
Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 222, 199 S. W. (2d) 943 (1947).
Langford v. Rogers, 278 Mich. 310, 270 N. W. 692 (1936).
Lassiter v. Shell Oil Co., 188 Wash. 371, 62 P. (2d) 1096 (1936).

NOTES
all been considered guests. It is interesting to note a line of causes in this category
in which the driver has been compensated by payment for a collateral thing, such

as carriage of a patient to a hospital with a friend or relative accompanying, 22 or
transportation of a horse to a farm with the owner of the horse riding along.2 3
It has been held in these cases that the carriage for hire does not extend to the
occupant and he is riding for his own benefit and consequently is a guest.
It is when some benefit to the owner is claimed through the transportation

that the difficulty arises. If the benefit incurred is an "incident to hospitality,
companionship, or the like",24 or one which arises "from social relations and cour-

tesies", 25 it is not enough to constitute payment or compensation as set forth and
defined by statute. One doing part of the driving at the operator's request is a
guest, because "the benefit conferred is too trivial to change the relationship". 2 6

A night's lodging at the expense of the occupant, 27 or the assistance in pushing the
automobile out of the snow, 28 or lifting a gear into and out of a trunk29 is not
adequate benefit to change the occupant's status as a guest. Part payment of expenses is also a benefit of this sort, and in most cases where the ride had in its
inception a social purpose, the courts have held that, "such a social invitee is a
guest even though he may contribute toward expenses of the journey..? 0 One
going on a fishing trip and purchasing part of the gasoline,31 or an agreement that
the driver would pay the toll fare one way and the occupant pay the return fare,32
or arrangement by which the occupant was to pay one-third of the costs of the trip
and furnish the lunch,3 would not change the relationship and the occupants have
been deemed guests.
A benefit incidental in the sense it is not sufficient to constitute payment or
compensation under the statutes may, however, ripen into a tangible benefit. Under the condition that the occupant promises to drive and the trip would not have
been attempted but for that promise, a special tangible benefit will have occurred
under the California guest law.34 In those cases in which the courts have held
that the payment of expenses actually constitutes a substantial benefit, it has been
found that payment has been made or offered through a prearranged plan33 or,
being the motivating factor in affording the transportation,) 6 amounted to direct
payment for such transportation. Also, if the driver insists or requests that the

22.
23.
24.
25.

Morales v. Employer's Liability Assurance Co., 202 La. 755, 12 So. (2d) 804 (1943).
273, 69 N. E. (2d) 878 (1946).
Miller v. Miller, 395 Ill.
Connett v. Winget, 374 Il. 531, 30 N. E. (2d) 1 (1940).
App. 303, 50 N. E. (2d) 847 (1943).
Boyd v. Mueller, 320 Ill.

26. Albrecht v. Safeway Stores, 159 Ore. 331, 80 P. (2d) 62 (1938).

27. Drea v. Drea, 292 Mass. 477, 198 N. E. 743 (1935).
28. Ruel v. Langelier, 299 Mass. 240, 12 N. E. (2d) 735 (1938).
29. Melcher v. Adams, 174 Ore. 75, 146 P. (2d) 354 (1944).
30. Doherty v. Edwards, 227 Iowa 1264, 290 N. W. 672 (1940).

31. Barnard v. Heather, 135 Neb. 513, 282 N. W. 534 (1938).
32. Starkweather v. Hession, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 336, 73 P. (2d) 247 (1937).
33. McCormick v. Pickerell, 225 Iowa 1076, 283 N. W. 899 (1939).

34. Druzanich v. Crilery, 19 Cal. (2d) 439, 122 P. (2d) 53 Sup. Ct. (1942) ; cf. Kruzie
v. Sanders, 23 Cal. (2d) 237, 143 P. (2d) 704 Sup. Ct. (1943).

35. Teders v. Rothermel, 205 Minn. 470, 286 N. W. 353 (1939)
Statute).
36. cf. Kruzie v. Sanders, Supra note 34.

(construing Florida
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occupant pay his share,37 payment of such will also amount to consideration for
the transportation and the case will not fall within the statute. ". . . the exception
should apply only where the payment was the chief motivating cause for the trip
or carriage. .. ."38
Under the general classification of benefit to the driver there are a group of
cases in which a "share a ride arrangement" has been effectuated. This type of
arrangement consists of reciprocal use of the automobile to save tires, gasoline, or
for convenience. During the last war much litigation arose from these claims, and
in industrial areas today this type of "share-a-ride" arrangement is still much used.
The numerical majority seems to hold that when such an arrangement exists, the
occupant is not a guest.3 9 There are, however, several cases in which an opposite
conclusion has been reached. 40
In addition to this general category, there are situations where the ride is
offered and accepted for the purpose of performing a gratuitous service to the
driver or owner. A person invited into an automobile by the driver for the sole
purpose of pointing out a particular location was not a guest under the Ohio
statute.4 1 One being induced to render an opinion, whether as to the physical condition of a mutual relative 42 or as to the location of a future business site, 4 3 is not
considered a guest. Nor is one who accepts a ride for the purpose of interviewing
his employer about getting a job for the owner of the automobile.44
Another type of benefit to the driver or owner is when the transportation is
offered in the business of the operator. When the driver is attempting to sell real
estate to the occupant thereby rendering the invitation with an eye to an anticipated profit,45 the decisions clearly indicate that the occupant is not a guest. 46 In
several jurisdictions the statutes specifically exempt prospective purchasers of an
automobile, in which the occupant is the buyer, from its effects.47 It has been
held, in fact, that the presence of any one other than the purchaser that will enhance the possibilities of the sale will be payment enough to take him out of the
guest class. 48 It has been similarly decided that when the trip is for the mutual
business benefit of both the driver and occupant, the occupant is not a guest. 49
Many decisions seem to advance the proposition that the relationship of the
37. McMahon v. DeKraay, 70 S. D. 180, 16 N. W. (2d) 308 (1944)
statute).

(construing Arkansas

38. Pilcher v. Erney, 155 Kan. 257, 124 P. (2d) 461 (1942).
39. Coerver v. Haab, 23 Wash. (2d) 481, 161 P. (2d) 194 (1945) ; Ott v. Perrin, 116 Ind.
App. 315, 63 N. E. (2d) 163 (1945).
40. Everett v. Burg, 301 Mich. 734, 4 N. W. (2d) 63, 146 A. L. R. 639 (1942).
41. Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N. E. (2d) 11 (1938).
42. Ohgan v. Byron, 33 A. (2d) 779 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943) (construing Ohio statute).
43. Cardnal v. Reinecke, 290 Mich. 15, 273 N. W. 330 (1937).
44. Fachadio v. Krovitz, 62 Cal. App. (2d) 362, 144 P. (2d) 646 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1st
Dist. 1944).

45. Supra note 24.
46. Robb v. Ramey Associates, 1 Tory's Rep. (Del.) 520, 14 A. (2d) 394 (Super. Ct. 1940).
47. Idaho Code Ann. 1932 sec. 48-902; Vernon's Tex. Stat. 1948 sec. 6701b; Rem. Rev.

Stat. Wash. sec. 6360-121; N. M. Stat. Ann. 1941 sec. 68-1002; Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann.

1934 sec. 11265.
48. Mitchell v. Heaton, 231 Iowa 260, 1 N. W. (2d) 284 (1941).

49. Ark. Valley Co-op. Rural Electric Co. v. Elkine, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S. W. (2d) 538
(1940).
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parties is a material factor in determining whether one is a guest or not,50 but the
relationships of employer-employee,51 husband and wife, or members of the same
family, would seem of little importance. Because the driver and occupant are
members of the same family does not exclude the occupant from being a guest
or does not necessarily make him one, 52 and one is a guest within the meaning of
the statutes when he is being transported by his employer if a substantial benefit
accrues.53
In every jurisdiction where this type of statute has been enacted compensation or benefit to the driver has been the determining factor in deciding whether
one is a guest. It is obvious that this compensation can be of several somewhat
standardized types. It is because of this that the statutes have been criticized.
What might be sufficient compensation in the drivers own mind, in many instances,
will not even be considered by the courts. It seems rather harsh and even cruel at
times to deny a recovery to a person whose presence in the car for reasons of companionship and friendship, has been desired. The courts must follow the legislature, however, and in so doing they must use objective standards in deciding
what is or is not compensation within the statutes. There must be some test or
some standardized method by which it can be determined by extrinsic evidence
whether the passenger is a guest or not.
There is no doubt that the evils to be corrected by these statutes, to prevent
collusion among close friends to defraud insurance companies and to prevent
recovery by ungrateful strangers who have generously been given a ride by a
motorist, have been corrected to a great extent. However, the statutes having attained their purposes, do not stop there. Recovery is denied in every case where
it is shown that the occupant is a gratuitous passenger. As a result, many claims
where no fraud is attempted or no ungratefulness shown are forbidden in their
inception. This should not be so. Since the first inquiry in every case under these
statutes is whether one is a guest or not and since the answer to this is dependent
on the various judicial definitions of compensation or payment, the courts by
construing the statutory language should and can, without frustrating the intent
of the legislature, take a more liberal and equitable view of the various situations
and, if necessary, in the particular case, allow claims of otherwise gratuitous
passengers by finding compensation.
JACK

50. Richard v. Parks, 19 Tenn. App. 615, 93 S. W. (2d) 639 (1936).
51. Long v. Archer, 221 Ind. 186, 46 N. E. (2d) 818 (1943).
52. Finn v. Drtina, 194 P. (2d) 347 (Wash. 1948).
53. Peery v. Mershon, 149 Fla. 351, 5 So. (2d) 694 (1942).
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